


*Felix Anderl, Jannis Julien Grimm, Nina Moya Schreieder,
Elias Steinhilper, Tareq Sydiq*

All Eyes on Gaza / Zusammen für Gaza

Profile of the solidarity protests on September 27, 2025



ipb

2 **2025**
ipb working paper
ISSN2747-5700

ipb working papers | Berlin, October 2025

ISSN (Print) 2699-2019

ISSN (Online) 2747-5700

The ipb working papers are published by the Association for Protest and Movement Research (Verein für Protest- und Bewegungsforschung e.V.). They appear at irregular intervals. The association is the sponsor of the institute of the same name. Its activities are documented at <http://protestinstitut.eu>. Henry Rammelt, Dieter Rucht, and Svenja Spyra are responsible for editing the ipb working papers.

All texts published in the series to date are available online at:

<https://protestinstitut.eu/publikationen/>



All Eyes on Gaza / Together for Gaza. Profile of the solidarity protests on September 27, 2025 by Felix Anderl, Jannis Julien Grimm, Nina Moya Schreieder, Elias Steinhilper, and Tareq Sydiq is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC-BY 4.0).

The cover page was created using a photo of the protests in front of the Victory Column. The photo by Jannis Grimm is licensed under a Creative Commons CC-0 license.

Authors

Felix Anderl

Zentrum für Konfliktforschung, Philipps-Universität Marburg

Universität Marburg

felix.anderl@uni-marburg.de

Jannis Julien Grimm

Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (INTERACT)

Freie Universität Berlin

jannis.grimm@fu-berlin.de

Nina Moya Schreieder

Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (INTERACT)

Freie Universität Berlin

moyanina@student.hu-berlin.de

Elias Steinhilper

Deutsches Zentrum für Intergrations- und Migrationsforschung (DeZIM)

steinhilper@dezim-institut.de

Tareq Sydiq

Zentrum für Konfliktforschung, Philipps-Universität Marburg

Universität Marburg

tareq.sydiq@uni-marburg.de

The study was co-directed by all authors; contributions were made in equal parts and are listed alphabetically. In addition to the team of authors, a team of volunteers consisting of scientists and alumni from various institutions was involved in conducting the survey. We would like to express our special thanks to Joy Brinsa, Malaiz Daud, Sophie Falschebner, Annelise Finney, Mara Junge, Lars Mussehl, Hanna Schnieders, Philipp Srama, Vedika Singhania, Damon Taleghani, and Jan Wilkens for their support. We would also like to thank the editors of this series, Dieter Rucht and Henry Rammelt, for their feedback. Thanks to Paul Blamire for editing the English version.

Anderl, Felix/Grimm, Jannis Julien/Moya Schreieder, Nina/Steinhilper, Elias/Sydiq, Tareq. 2025. All Eyes on Gaza / Zusammen für Gaza. Profile of the solidarity protests on September 27, 2025. *ipb working paper series*, 2/2025. Berlin: ipb.

Abstract

This working paper analyzes two protest events that took place in Berlin on September 27, 2025, under the titles “All Eyes on Gaza – Stop the Genocide” and “Together for Gaza,” bringing tens of thousands of people onto the streets. Both protests are part of a prolonged, transnational wave of mobilization that refers to the systematic destruction and humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, which numerous experts classify as genocide, and responds to the restriction of solidarity with Palestine in Germany. The core of the paper is a systematic breakdown of the results of a standardized survey of participants at the demonstrations. It examines the socio-demographic profile of the protesters, their political attitudes and protest experiences, their motivations, and their perceptions of the social context in Germany. The results provide new insights into the dynamics, composition, and motives of Palestine solidarity protests in Germany, especially when compared with data from previous ipb demonstration surveys on other topics.

Introduction	1
The protests in context	2
<i>The demonstration(s) on September 27, 2025</i>	3
<i>Alternative- and counter-protests</i>	4
Methodology	5
<i>Survey procedure</i>	5
<i>Supplementary short interviews</i>	6
<i>Survey instrument</i>	6
Results	6
<i>Sociodemographic profile</i>	7
<i>Degree of organization</i>	8
<i>Protest experience</i>	9
<i>Previous experiences with repression</i>	10
<i>Motives and Strategic Goals</i>	11
<i>Trust in democratic order</i>	13
<i>Political positioning</i>	13
<i>Attitude toward social controversies</i>	14
<i>Assessment of public discourse</i>	15
<i>Concerns and expectations</i>	15
Discussion and outlook	16
Bibliography	19
Appendix	22

Introduction

How protests are reported shapes how they are treated politically. A striking example of this was the reporting published in the run-up to the large-scale mobilization in Berlin in solidarity with Gaza on September 27, 2025, which outlined escalation, appropriation by “radical enemies of Israel,” and internal discord—long before there was any reliable information about participants, motives, or the actual course of events. With the headline “Is there anything that won’t go wrong tomorrow?”, the Tagesspiegel newspaper practically anticipated failure (Leber 2025).

Such predictions, which interpret protests involving thousands of participants in a sweeping manner without any solid empirical evidence, narrow the public debate on one of the most heated social conflicts in recent German history. They reinforce the already advanced polarization and narrow the view of complex mobilizations: individual actors and slogans are taken as representative of the whole, heterogeneous alliances are homogenized, and risks are maximized. Since fall 2023, public debate has oscillated between under-exposure and scandalization (Tröger and Hafez 2024; Brandenburg and Mahdhaoui 2024; Goldmann 2025; Strippel et al. 2025); individual incidents are often projected onto mobilizations as a whole, while reliable data on “who is demonstrating” is absent or late. In Berlin in particular, where media arenas, administrative practices, and police strategies are particularly closely inter-related, such narratives help determine whether protests are interpreted as a legitimate articulation, a disruption, or a security problem. The fact that the same events can be described simultaneously as an “impressive sign” or as a “threat” points to the openness of interpretation—and thus to the need to underpin analyses empirically. This is where the present study comes in: it contrasts a speculative narrative with an empirically based description of the composition, motives,

and perceptions of the demonstrators.

The focus is on two related street protests, both held in Berlin on September 27, 2025: the “Together for Gaza” demonstration march (starting at Alexanderplatz, and following a route through the government district towards Großer Stern), and the subsequent large rally “All Eyes on Gaza – Stop the Genocide” at Großer Stern. The organizers spoke of over 100,000 participants, while the Berlin police estimated around 60,000 (tagesschau.de 2025).¹ Together, these protests mark a culmination of the mobilization of solidarity with Palestine in Germany since 2023. Official sources reported that the protests were largely peaceful. The event organizers wanted the strength of the mobilization to be understood as a sign in German national discourse. The two events are therefore suitable as key cases: they are large, politically controversial, highly charged in the media—and at the same time sufficiently clearly defined to contrast the anecdotal and exaggerated portrayals of Palestine solidarity mobilizations, which dominate the debate, with reliable data on the largest protests to date.

The study is intended to be empirical. By examining who took part in the demonstrations on September 27, 2025, for what reason, and how participants justified their protest, it aims to fill three empirical gaps in particular:

- 1) Classification within the protest cycle: The study situates the two events in Berlin within the current cycle of Palestine solidarity protests and relates the findings to earlier Institute for Protest and Social Movement Research (ipb) surveys on different topics in order to identify specific features and continuities.
- 2) Composition of protests: For the first time in the German context, we provide empirical findings on the composition of protests in terms of sociodemographic profile, political socialization, and mobilization pathways.

¹ Since the demonstration marches were fluid and many people participated in parts of both gatherings, the participants were not all on the streets at the same time. However, spread out over the day, at different times and locations, the number given by the organizers appears to be realistic.

- 3) Motivations and perceptions: The study re-constructs the concerns and issues that were decisive for participation in the protests. This also includes perceptions of media coverage and the government's handling of protests in solidarity with Gaza.

The study is based on a quantitative research design that draws on a tried-and-tested survey approach from protest research (Andretta and della Porta 2014; Fillieule and Blanchard 2010; Klandermans 2022; Teune and Ullrich 2015). For both protests, participants were selected on site according to a systematic principle and invited to take part in an online survey that was protected against manipulation by personal access codes. 301 people took part in the survey.

The study thus makes a twofold contribution: firstly, analytical, by using a standardized participant survey to paint a nuanced picture of the protesters; secondly, by opening up debate, as it compares the results with comparable data sets on protests in Germany, thereby enabling classification.

The structure of the study follows the established format of ipb working papers: we first outline the context and state of research, then briefly describe the survey design and present the findings on the composition, motives, and perceptions of the participants, before placing the results in the context of the current protest cycle and the German debate.

The protests in context

Solidarity with Palestine has long been a highly controversial issue in German society and is closely intertwined with debates about memory politics and “reasons of state” (Marwecki 2020; Atshan and Galor 2020). Since the attacks on October 7, 2023, in Israel, and the Gaza War, which numerous scholars and human rights organizations have classified as a genocide (e.g., Albanese 2024; Amnesty International 2024; B'Tselem 2021; Human Rights Watch 2024; IAGS 2025; O'Brien 2025; Bartov 2024), solidarity with Palestine has taken on a new dynamic. What began as spontaneous reactions to the images from Gaza turned into an ongoing

public debate about responsibility, violence, and belonging. In Berlin in particular, this mobilization was met with a highly problematizing public discourse and strict administrative practices. Rallies were restricted or viewed with suspicion in many places, and solidarity with Palestine was often suspected of extremism and anti-Semitism. At the same time, new alliances formed, combining vigils, large demonstrations, cultural formats, and campus initiatives.

In addition to its political function as the capital city, Berlin also serves as a central venue within the solidarity movement because it is home to the largest Palestinian exile community in Europe (Koch and Ragab 2018) and because the protests in the capital are supported by a dense network of social movements and activist initiatives, most of which were already active before October 7. These networks include diaspora groups, left-wing, anti-fascist, and abolitionist initiatives, anti-Zionist Jewish organizations, and students. However, with increasing marginalization and repression (Pallies et al. 2025), the spectrum of those who regularly participated in solidarity protests has narrowed. Thus, several phases of mobilization can be identified in the city.

In the early phases (second half of 2023), there were mainly spontaneous rallies and large marches, with significant peaks following events such as the explosion at Al-Ahli Hospital and the ground attack and bombing of Jabaliya. A global day of action on November 4 mobilized an extremely heterogeneous group of protesters in Berlin, with several tens of thousands of participants. From the beginning of 2024, protests finally responded more visibly to international proceedings and humanitarian signals, such as the ICJ hearings, the ICJ ruling, and the official declaration of a hunger crisis in Gaza. Individual cases with high symbolic significance, such as the killing of Hind Rajab or the bombing of the tent camp in Rafah, continued to catalyze mobilization during this phase. From spring 2024 onwards, the protests shifted temporarily to universities (Mauthofer and Grimm 2025). Occupations at the Free University of Berlin and the symbolic renaming of an institute at Humboldt University in Berlin to the “Jabaliya Institute” marked the increasing intertwining of local student protests and

transregional references. As the protests continued, however, the demonstrations stabilized from mid-2024 onwards in the form of smaller street protests with a frequency of around a dozen collective actions per month. In addition, mourning rituals, legal interventions, and cultural events gained in importance. Mass protests, such as those on September 27, 2025, remained the exception and were limited to symbolic days such as Quds Day or International Women's Day.

This is also due to the highly delegitimizing discursive context. Since October 7, 2023, Palestine solidarity protests in Germany have been even more strongly delegitimized than before (Haugbolle and Olsen 2023; Hever 2019; Al-Taher 2024; Marwecki 2020) in a highly morally charged and politicized field of conflict (Della Porta 2024; Grimm and Mauthofer 2025). Political representatives and parts of the media often frame street protests as a security problem or as an expression of blanket anti-Semitic attitudes. This generalization (re)produces a polarized public sphere in which camp formation dominates over differentiated analysis (Grimm 2024). Studies on the Berlin context show that there are large gaps in the reporting on the composition and objectives of the demonstrators, creating a vacuum that can be filled by anecdotal political commentary (Grimm et al. 2025).

The dominant problematization of Palestine solidarity is part of longer-term developments in which restrictive practices such as evictions, funding sanctions, and bans on assemblies have been repeatedly imposed (Arzt 2025; Ullrich 2024; 2025; Aue et al. 2025). After October 7, these patterns intensified, for example through short-term restrictions, large-scale police presence, and interventions at large rallies.

The demonstration(s) on September 27, 2025

The study examined participants in the “Together for Gaza” demonstration on September 27, 2025, in Berlin and the subsequent large-scale rally “All Eyes on Gaza – Stop the Genocide.” Parallel to the large-scale mobilization, counter- and alternative events developed that reflected the internal heterogeneity of the solidarity movement with Gaza. Particularly noteworthy is the demonstration that started at Moritzplatz under the slogan “United

for Liberation.” This constellation has several implications for the data collection of the present study.

Firstly, the clear spatial and temporal structure of the feeder route and the central rally made it possible to set up defined survey points along the route and at Großer Stern. The combination of channeled inflows and a static destination favored systematic sampling and the addressing of different subgroups within the broad alliance. Second, the parallel existence of alternative mobilizations created potential differences in selection and composition between the central protest event and boycotting or independently mobilized sub-publics. This must be taken into account when interpreting differences in results.

The two gatherings on September 27, 2025, were linked both thematically and logistically. The “Together for Gaza” demonstration march served as a feeder demonstration for the rally at Großer Stern, beginning at 2:30 p.m. at Alexanderplatz. The approved route led via Spandauer Strasse, Karl-Liebknecht-Strasse, Unter den Linden, Wilhelmstrasse, Dorotheenstrasse, Scheidemannstrasse, and Yitzhak-Rabin-Strasse to Straße des 17. Juni, where the main rally was scheduled to begin at around 5:00 p.m. This subsequent large rally, “All Eyes on Gaza,” at Großer Stern was then conceived as an open stage for speeches and musical acts between 5:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. The artistic program featured prominent performers. Among those announced were the Berlin rap trio K.I.Z, the artists Pas-hanim, Ali Bumaye, Aya Samra, and others. The Berlin police were present throughout the city with around 1,800 officers. The police assessment of the situation on the central demonstration axis was largely positive (Der Tagesspiegel Online 2025).

The groups supporting the two protests overlapped significantly and, according to the organizers, included more than 50 organizations and associations, including Amnesty International, medico international, Eye4Palestine, the Palestinian Community in Germany, Israelis for Peace, and the Left Party. The list of supporters also included climate movement activists such as Fridays for Future. The joint appeal text of both events condemned war crimes and human rights violations regardless of who commits them, but directed its main criticism at the Israeli

government and its supporters in view of the massive destruction in Gaza.² In particular, they called for an end to German arms deliveries to Israel, political support for an immediate and lasting ceasefire, unhindered access for humanitarian aid, support for international jurisdiction, the release of all victims of war crimes on both sides, and the preservation of freedom of expression, assembly, and science in Germany. Infrastructure measures included a medical tent, barrier-free sanitary facilities, and organizational information on self-sufficiency for participants. A nationwide travel program with group transportation from 44 cities underscored the intended reach beyond Berlin.

The key difference between the two events lay in the role played by the Left Party. The party's solidarity with civil society organizations was the result of previous internal debates, in which the question of an internal party definition of anti-Semitism was particularly controversial. At the party conference on May 10, 2025, in Chemnitz, the delegates voted against the advice of party chairman Jan van Aken in favor of a definition that does not classify calls for boycotts of Israeli products as anti-Semitic per se. After initially announcing and then postponing its own large-scale protest in July, the party's specific role in the protest on September 27 remained controversial at first and ultimately resulted in a compromise: while the party played a central role in the feeder demonstration, it deliberately took a back seat at the large rally at Großer Stern in order not to jeopardize the intended cross-party character of the event. With this in mind, the organizers of the rally at Großer Stern also issued behavioral guidelines emphasizing the non-partisan nature of the event and asked participants to refrain from displaying party flags. At the same time, the majority of the organizers appeared on the calls for both events, thus emphasizing the Left Party's involvement in a broader protest alliance.

Alternative- and counter-protests

Parallel to the feeder demonstration at Alexanderplatz, an alternative rally was scheduled at

Moritzplatz in Berlin-Kreuzberg. The background to this was the open criticism of the central gatherings in Berlin Mitte by some long-standing Palestine solidarity groups. They criticized, for example, the role and visibility of large NGOs and prominent individuals in "All Eyes on Gaza" and "Together for Gaza" and expressed their fear that the authority to interpret solidarity with Palestine could shift from grassroots, continuously active networks to supra-regional actors. In essence, there were conflicting goals between formulas for understanding such as "peace" and demands for the "liberation" of Palestine. Against this backdrop, parts of the solidarity movement openly called for a boycott of the large-scale events and organized their own demonstration. The march in Kreuzberg initially comprised around 1,200 people and moved toward Südsterne under heavy police presence, but was broken up by the police after only a few hundred meters, with the use of force. Despite the differences in the run-up to the event, solidarity with the protesters at the alternative demonstration at Moritzplatz was repeatedly expressed on stage at the large rally at Großer Stern, and the police violence there was condemned.

In addition to these gatherings, another demonstration by the Progressive Left Network took place on the same day, illustrating the institutional pluralization within the party-affiliated spectrum. Of the other parties represented in the Bundestag, the Greens in particular discussed their relationship to the large demonstration without making a clear statement for or against participation. In a smaller counter-event, around 100 people gathered to show their support for Israel and "against all forms of anti-Semitism." This coexistence of large protests, alternative mobilizations, and smaller counter-demonstrations illustrates the fragmentation, but also the resonance, of public debate in Berlin's urban space.

² See: <https://www.zusammen-fuer-gaza.de/> and <https://all-eyes-on-gaza.de/>.

Methodology

The study is based on a quantitative research design that draws on a tried-and-tested survey approach from protest research (Andretta and della Porta 2014; Fillieule and Blanchard 2010; Klandermans 2022; Teune and Ullrich 2015). The underlying method was adapted for the German context by the Institute for Protest and Movement Research (ipb) and has been used in numerous demonstration surveys in recent years (e.g., Anderl et al. 2025; Meier et al. 2023; Haunss et al. 2023; Rucht et al. 2024). Based on this approach, the survey was conducted by a team of ipb members: Felix Anderl and Tareq Sydiq (Philipps University Marburg), Jannis Julien Grimm and Nina Moya Schreieder (INTERACT, Free University of Berlin), and Elias Steinhilper (DeZIM). For the survey on the Gaza demonstrations, the standard instrument was supplemented with specific questions on the context of the demonstration.

Survey procedure

Fieldwork began at 2:30 p.m. on the day of the event on Berlin's Museum Island, where the survey team gathered and divided into five small groups. The team consisted of twenty volunteer students and researchers who had completed digital training the day before. In addition to the content-related objectives of the study, this training also conveyed uniform standards for addressing people, conducting conversations, documenting refusals, and taking safety precautions in the field.

Special attention was paid to the diversity of the team: the composition of the interviewers was to be as heterogeneous as possible in terms of gender, age, origin, and language skills in order to minimize selection effects in contact behavior. This ensured that different groups of demonstrators were approached with equal probability and openness.

All participants wore visible name tags with the words "Survey team 'All Eyes on Gaza/Together for Gaza' – Institute for Protest and Movement Research." In order to avoid any association of the survey teams with specific political camps and the resulting distortion of the protest participants' responses, the survey teams wore neutral

clothing and strictly refrained from wearing clothing and symbols that could be understood as an expression of political positioning (e.g., clothing colors associated with the Palestinian or Israeli flag or thematically charged T-shirts).

Data collection began at 3 p.m. and was based on a systematic and proven approach that is established as the standard for on-site sampling in international protest research (Stekelenburg et al. 2012; Peterson et al. 2018a). In order to generate a sample that reflects the heterogeneous field of participants as reliably as possible and which is not based on self-selection, the "pointer" system was used (Andretta and della Porta 2014, 319–21). In each field group, one person was responsible for the selection: they continuously counted the participants along the demonstration march and assigned every tenth person to the interviewers. The pointers regularly changed their position in order to cover different segments of the demonstration—from the front loudspeaker truck to the rear end. This separation of selection and approach reduces the risk of biased selection decisions (Peterson et al. 2018b, 233).

The approach was adjusted for the static demonstration at Großer Stern. There, the interviewers approached every fifth person, systematically covering the area from front to back. The end of the fieldwork period was set at 7:30 p.m. This meant that the survey period lasted 4.5 hours (3:00 p.m. to 7:30 p.m.). The staggered approach in terms of time and space ensured that demonstrators who arrived later in the event were also included.

The participants were addressed with a short, standardized sentence emphasizing the scientific nature of the study, the voluntary nature of participation, and the anonymity of the survey. The text read as follows:

"Would you be willing to participate in a scientific study about today's demonstration? We are from the Institute for Protest and Social Movement Studies, and we are conducting a survey to learn more about the composition and motives of the demonstrators. You can complete the questionnaire online after the

demonstration. You'll find the link and your personal access code on the flyer. Participation is, of course, anonymous; no personal data will be collected."

The speech was deliberately kept brief so as not to disrupt the flow of the demonstration. When asked, the interviewers explained the scientific purpose of the study, its independence from government or party political clients, the anonymity of the data, and the online participation process, following a standardized guide.

A total of 1,003 invitation slips with individual access codes were distributed. These slips contained a brief description of the study, the URL for the online survey, and a single-use access code to ensure that only demonstrators present at the site could participate; multiple entries with the same code were not possible. For the evaluation, only one entry per code was taken into account. The questionnaire was available in German and English to facilitate access for international participants. The choice of language (German or English) when addressing participants was based on the language preference of the person contacted.

Parallel to data collection, refusals and inquiries were systematically documented. This documentation of refusals included both the reason for refusal (e.g., lack of time, mistrust, language barriers) and qualitative impressions of the course of the conversation. The reflection logs of the survey team were incorporated into the methodological follow-up and data interpretation.

Supplementary short interviews

In addition to the online survey, the team conducted 43 short interviews on site, each lasting an average of three minutes. Every 20th person approached was asked to participate in this short survey. The purpose of the survey was to collect basic demographic characteristics (age, gender, level of education) and a few questions about attitudes. The data obtained enables a comparison between the online and on-site samples and helps to assess whether certain groups—such as older people, those with less digital literacy, or those who are particularly politically engaged—are over- or underrepresented in the online data set (Rüdig 2008; Walgrave et al. 2016; Walgrave

and Verhulst 2011; Rainsford and Saunders 2024).

The survey proceeded without incident and was received positively by the majority of demonstrators. Most of those approached responded in a friendly or interested manner; only a few declined to participate, mostly due to time constraints or tiredness. Individual team members reported encountering people they had already approached, which indicates saturation as a result of recruiting over several hours.

Survey instrument

The questionnaire comprised a total of 33 questions, which took an average of around ten minutes to complete. The topics covered included:

- Mobilization and motivation to participate;
- Political attitudes and perceptions of the conflict;
- Assessments of the demonstration itself (e.g., security or anticipated repression and reporting);
- Emotional states and identification with the Gaza solidarity movement;
- Sociodemographic data.

The online survey was conducted using LimeSurvey software and was open until October 5, 2025. A total of 301 questionnaires were received (244 of which were complete). Based on the number of invitations distributed, this corresponds to a response rate of 30%, which is high compared to similar protest surveys in Germany (Daphi et al. 2023, 447). The collected data was evaluated using the statistical software R. Text-based responses were numerically coded, where possible, to make them usable for quantitative evaluations..

Results

Overall, the protest landscape on September 27, 2025, shows a complex interplay of a broad civil society alliance, party political involvement including internal controversies, artistic and cultural elements as a resource for mobilization, alternative forms of expression within the

movement, and a restrained, predominantly de-escalating security architecture. These contextual conditions form the frame of reference for the survey results presented below and the analysis of the composition, motives, and perceptions of the participants of “Together for Gaza” and “All Eyes on Gaza.” At the same time, they mark the limits of generalizability to protest-external sub-segments that articulated themselves in separate formations on the same day. In the following, we break down the results of our survey along the thematic blocks of the questionnaire listed above.

201 of those surveyed (78.5%) stated that they had participated in the “All Eyes on Gaza – Stop the Genocide!” rally at Großer Stern. Almost as many, namely 198 people (77.3%), stated that they had participated in the “Together for Gaza” demonstration that started at Alexanderplatz. The majority of our study participants (55.9%) also took part in both the feeder demonstration and the rally at Großer Stern, at least for part of the time. Since multiple answers were possible, the sum of the relative frequencies exceeds 100%.

There was significantly less overlap with the demonstration at Moritzplatz. Only six of the 301 people who completed the questionnaire stated that they had participated in both the rally at Moritzplatz and later in the large demonstrations in Berlin Mitte.³

Sociodemographic profile

First, we will take a look at the socio-demographic profile of the demonstrators. The demonstrators who took part in our survey were between 15 and 77 years old, with an average age of 36.5. Of these, slightly more than half (54.6%) identified as male, 41.3% as female, and 4.1% as “diverse.” Just under a third of respondents were in education (school pupils, trainees, students). Another third are in full-time employment and 12.6% are in part-time employment. Around 12% of respondents are self-employed (slightly above the

figure for the general population). We found low figures for civil servants, unemployed people, pensioners, early retirees, and retirees.

The high level of education among the demonstrators is noteworthy. When asked “What is your highest level of education to date?”, 58.4% responded that they had a university or technical college degree. 11.4% even have a doctorate (see Figure 1). 22.5% have a high school diploma. A total of 7.3% stated that their highest level of education was a secondary school diploma. Only one person had no diploma (yet). Many come from academic families: 42.6% say that both of their parents studied at a university, and another 23% say that one parent did. 86.1% of those surveyed have German citizenship and three-quarters were born in Germany (see Figure 2), while 10% were born in another EU country. Direct personal or family ties to the conflict region were rather the exception: two participants were born in Israel (0.8%) and 4.5% in another country in the Middle East or North Africa. A similar picture emerges when looking at the parents' country of birth. Six participants stated that their parents were born in Palestine (2.4%). Otherwise, the figures are similar. The question about the participants' place of residence shows that, despite nationwide mobilization, Berliners in particular were addressed. 97% of participants live in Germany, 70% of them in Berlin. The rest are spread across other federal states.

Our data also provides information on whether the respondents attended the demonstration alone or accompanied by others (see Figure 3).⁴ Overall, it is clear that the majority of respondents did not attend the demonstration alone, but in the company of others. The most common response was that they attended the demonstration with friends (59.6%). Participation with a partner (26.5%) and with members of one's own initiative, community, or association (19.6%) was also mentioned relatively frequently. Accompaniment by family members (18.5%) and

³ Given the time constraints and the significantly smaller size of the protest at Moritzplatz, with fewer than 2,000 participants, the total number of Moritzplatz demonstrators who came to the Großer Stern is nevertheless noteworthy in the sample.

⁴ Multiple answers were possible, so that one person could indicate several forms of support.

acquaintances (14.6%) was also common. Less common was participation with classmates, fellow students, or coworkers (6.5%). Only a small proportion of respondents stated that they had participated in the demonstration alone (9.2%). The high number of multiple responses also indicates that many people were involved in several social constellations, for example with friends and at the same time with members of an initiative. These results correspond with the state of research in social movement studies, according to which demonstrations also represent a social event for many participants.

Degree of organization

The results of our survey shed light on the role of the organizations calling for the demonstration in mobilizing support for it (see Figure 4).⁵ The majority of participants (66.5%) were not involved in the demonstration through formal organizational affiliation. Among those who are involved in an organization, membership or activity in the Left Party was most frequently cited (20.2%). In addition, there is involvement in civil society and human rights organizations such as Amnesty International Germany (3.9%) and medico international (3.5%). There were also individual mentions of the Palestinian Community in Germany (0.4%) and Eye4Palestine (1.6%). The category "Other" included other smaller initiatives and groups, which accounted for a total of 10.5% of the mentions.

Overall, it is clear that although the demonstrations were supported by a broad alliance of different organizations, the majority of participants did not belong directly to any of these groups. Nevertheless, the comparatively high proportion of 20.2% who stated that they belonged to the Left Party is striking. This indicates that the party succeeded in effectively mobilizing its political environment. The Left Party thus apparently played a central role in the

organizational and personnel mobilization for the demonstration. At the same time, the high proportion of independent participants makes it clear that the mobilization had an impact beyond the party political milieu and also reached people without institutional ties.

Our results also show that even beyond the spectrum of organizers of large rallies, only a small proportion of respondents are actively involved in another organization that explicitly supports Palestine. Of a total of 259 people who answered the question, 232 respondents (90%) stated that they were not active in such an organization. Only 27 people (10%) said they were involved in a Palestine solidarity group or initiative outside of participating in demonstrations. This shows that active organized engagement in the context of Palestine solidarity is limited to a relatively small minority of participants. At the same time, the proportion of around 10% indicates that there is a group of experienced activists within the demonstration who have existing organizational structures and have presumably also brought these to bear in the mobilization. The vast majority of participants, on the other hand, do not appear to be firmly involved in Palestine solidarity organizations and seem to have attended the demonstration as an expression of spontaneous or issue-related solidarity. The appearance of pop culture figures at the rally at *Großer Stern* may also have had a mobilizing effect, but this cannot be confirmed by our study.

Apart from membership in movements and organizations that are decidedly supportive of Palestine, however, the findings show a high level of civic organization among respondents in very different segments of democratic civil society (see Figure 5). The majority of respondents answer the question about active or passive membership in a civil society organization positively.⁶

The highest level of active participation was found among members of sports or cultural

⁵ Since multiple responses were possible, the sum of the relative frequencies exceeds 100%.

⁶ Passive members are understood to be those who, for example, pay membership fees without further involvement; active members are those who participate, hold an office, or perform a function. This explanation was also part of the questionnaire.

associations (23.9% active and 8.6% passive). Around a quarter of those surveyed are active or passive members of a political party or political youth organization. Around 20% of participants have passive memberships in a trade union or professional association, or in a human rights organization, followed by religious communities or churches and environmental organizations. Around a third of respondents are active or passive members of other groups or organizations. Very few respondents are active or passive members of a peace policy organization.

The overlap with the traditional “peace movement,” which we wanted to explore through this question, among others, appears to be negligible in this regard. This can probably be explained in part by the age of the demonstrators. Elsewhere in the survey, we asked: “Do you consider yourself part of the peace movement?” 60.8% answered yes to this question, while 39.2% answered no.

Some of the demonstrators are actively concerned about building momentum. For example, one person interviewed commented as follows:

“The demonstrations held so far have been severely restricted and (police) repression has been enormous, especially when compared internationally. The movement needs to be broadly based, which is why it is important to support broad alliances such as Together for Gaza and All Eyes on Gaza.”⁷

The question of alliance capability was also important to the organizers. The focus here was particularly on not allowing outsiders, the police, or politicians to divide the demonstrators into “good” and “bad.” On the stage at Großer Stern, attempts were made on several occasions to join forces with the protests at Moritzplatz and express solidarity with the demonstrators there, especially in the context of the much more repressive police presence there.

Protest experience

Previous research on Palestine solidarity protests

indicates a high degree of consistency in the spectrum of protesters. In the context of repression and stigmatization, the composition of protests against Israeli warfare in Gaza has remained largely stable over the past two years. The participation of “newcomers” was rather the exception and concentrated on individual intersectional protest events, such as on International Women's Day on March 28, 2024 (Grimm et al. 2025). Against this background, our data show a mixed picture. When asked about their general participation in demonstrations over the past 12 months, 10% said they had already participated in many (>20) demonstrations in the past 12 months. Half had participated in a few (1-5) and 28.6% in some (6-2). Of particular interest are the 11% for whom the demonstrations on September 27 were the first occasion in the last 12 months that mobilized them to participate in a demonstration.

For 26 participants in our sample, participating in the demonstration was actually their first demonstration ever. A quarter of those surveyed had only been to a few demonstrations in their lives. In contrast, 44% are very experienced in demonstrations and 27% had already been to several demonstrations in the past.

The results in Figure 6 provide information about the respondents' previous experiences with Gaza-related demonstrations. Overall, it appears that a large proportion of participants already have experience protesting on this issue. 38.8% had already participated in a few (1-5), 20.2% had participated in several (6-20), and 7.4% had even participated in many (>20) Gaza-related demonstrations. However, a relatively large group, one-third of respondents (33.7%), stated that they had not previously participated in any Gaza-related demonstrations. This distribution illustrates that the demonstrations attracted both first-time participants and an experienced group of activists. One participant, for example, stated that this specific demonstration mobilization appealed to them more than previous protests:

⁷ Unless specified otherwise, all direct quotes were translated from German

“This was my first time ever attending a public gathering on the topic of Israel/Palestine, the Middle East conflict, war, and genocide, since October 7, 2023. I hesitated for a long time because, until now, there have been hardly any gatherings where there wasn't some kind of problem. This time, it was the breadth of the alliance that convinced me to finally go.”

While a significant proportion of respondents appeared to be newly mobilized around the issue, the proportion of experienced demonstrators indicates that there is also a stable and continuously active base that can be mobilized over a longer period of time and that also felt addressed by the demonstrations examined here. Here, too, one respondent emphasized that they hoped this demonstration would protect them from repression:

“I have been protesting for Palestine since my teenage years [...] I chose this protest because the masses make it safer for me to go with my kids than the autonomous Moritzplatz demonstration.”⁸

We can break down these findings in more detail based on our survey. We asked respondents to what extent they had participated in various activities related to Gaza over the past two years. Overall, the data shows a high level of civil society engagement, which is largely focused on nonviolent and symbolic forms of action (see Figure 7).

Respondents particularly frequently mentioned participating in demonstrations—68.6% stated that they had done so, while 30.2% said they had not. Supportive and symbolic actions were also widespread: 64.1% of respondents had signed a petition or public letter in the last two years, 57.6% said they had boycotted products, and 56.6% had donated money to a political organization or group. Similarly, 56.2% reported that they had drawn attention to a political issue on social media. Wearing symbols or badges of a campaign was also common (43.4%), albeit with a certain degree of reluctance, as almost as many said they had not done so (48.1%) or were unsure

(8.5%).

Participation in direct or confrontational forms of action was significantly lower. Only 15.9% of respondents had taken part in a strike in the last two years, and the same number (15.9%) had participated in a non-violent blockade, occupation, or other act of civil disobedience. Violent protests, i.e., the use of violence against property or persons, were almost completely ruled out. 95.3% of respondents said they had not participated in such actions.

Previous experiences with repression

Previous demonstrations in solidarity with Palestine were often associated with violence, with regular clashes between protesters and police forces. Human rights organizations and video recordings also document harsh protest policing. The data clearly illustrate this repressive context (see Figures 8-10).

The information provided on experiences of repression in connection with activities related to Gaza paints a worrying picture (see Figure 8). Although a narrow majority of respondents (53.5%) say they have never experienced repression in connection with activities related to Gaza, the remaining figures show that almost half of the participants have been affected by repressive measures at least once. For example, 15.1% report having experienced repression rarely, and another 15.1% report having experienced it sometimes. 7.3% stated that they had experienced repression often, and 8.2% very often. Taken together, this means that around 30% were repeatedly or regularly affected by state or social sanctions, and a total of just under 47% described some form of experience of repression. This figure is surprising in that just under a third of the participants were attending a Gaza-related demonstration for the very first time. Among those who had demonstrated particularly frequently in the past, the proportion of people who had experienced repression was particularly high (Figure 10). For example, 70% of those who say they have participated in more than five demonstrations related to Gaza have experienced repression themselves; among those with

⁸ Original quote in English

particularly extensive demonstration experience (more than 20 protests), the figure is as high as 83.3%.

Our data also provides information about the nature of the repression (see Figure 9). The responses show that the experiences reported cover a wide range of different forms of intervention—from social intimidation to physical violence. Intimidation was the most frequently cited form of repression: 56 people (50.0% of those who experienced repression) reported having been pressured or frightened in this way. This result suggests that psychological and social intimidation is the central form of repressive experience in the context of Gaza-related activism in Germany. In addition, 16.9% of those affected report professional restrictions—such as disadvantages in the work environment, social sanctions, or institutional consequences. 15.2% stated that they had experienced physical violence, and 10.7% had been threatened with physical violence. These percentages are significant when measured against the total group of respondents and indicate that repression sometimes also takes on physical or existential dimensions. A further 7.1% provided additional information under “Other” that points to other experiences of stress and threats.

With regard to concerns about police repression at the two large rallies, however, opinions among participants were mixed (see Figure 11). About one-third of respondents (31.3%) expressed agreement, with 11.1% saying they “strongly agree” and 20.2% saying they “somewhat agree.” This group thus signals a noticeable degree of concern about possible police repression in connection with the demonstration. One-fifth (21.0%) took a neutral position (“partly/partly”), while 47.9% of respondents rejected the statement (30.3% “disagree somewhat,” 17.6% “strongly disagree”). Although rejection of the statement prevails overall, it is clear that a significant proportion of participants were concerned about repressive behavior by the police.

Not all participants experienced police repression, but it left a clear mark on some of the

protesters. This applies above all to people with previous experience. At the same time, open-ended responses point to a possible connection between migration background and concern about repression, but this cannot be substantiated on the basis of the data collected and requires further research. For example, the size of the demonstration was explicitly interpreted in this context as a form of protection that encouraged people (especially those of non-German origin) who had not previously demonstrated to take to the streets:

“As a non-German who is here on a student visa, this also seemed like the safest occasion to voice my dissent (due to the size of the demonstration).”⁹

Motives and Strategic Goals

Figure 12 provides information about the motives that were important to the participants in the demonstration. Overall, it shows that all of the motives surveyed were rated as important or very important by a large majority of respondents.

The motive of “prompting politicians to take action” was mentioned particularly frequently. With almost unanimous agreement, it represents the most common motive for participation and points to the participants' focus on action. A similarly high proportion stated that it was important to them to “...send a message,” which indicates a symbolic motive. The motive of “generating media attention” was also very frequently rated as important. Educating and mobilizing people was rated as less important. Overall, the results show that participation in the demonstration was characterized by a combination of orientation towards political outcomes, symbolic expression, and the intention to raise awareness in the media. For some participants, the demonstration also served the purpose of finally being able to do something to counter their own “powerlessness,” as was expressed in some of the open-ended responses.

“I often feel powerless when I read the news about how many people have been killed in attacks this time.”

⁹ Original quote in English.

It is interesting to note that these attitudes toward demonstrating oneself change significantly when respondents are asked about the effect rather than the goal (see Figure 13). Demonstrations are considered most effective in terms of generating media attention: 50.6% of respondents consider protests to be very effective in this regard. The proportion is also high for the motive of “making a statement,” which was rated as very effective by 44.9%. However, respondents are hardly convinced of the political effectiveness. Only 7.3% anticipate that the demonstrations will be “very effective” in persuading politicians to take action. Assessments of the demonstrations’ effectiveness in educating others (13.4%) and mobilizing additional people (30.7%) are also relatively low in comparison. These results suggest that participants view the demonstrations primarily as a symbolically successful form of action, but less so as one with immediate political impact. The focus of the perceived impact is thus on public relations and visibility of the cause, as well as solidarity, while direct political influence is expected to be rather limited.

This picture is also reinforced by the evaluation of our open-ended initial question (“Please briefly explain why you took part in this demonstration”). These responses reveal a high degree of outrage, despair, and horror: about the “unbearable situation” in Gaza; “What is happening in Palestine is genocide and must be stopped immediately.” Participants refer to “solidarity with Palestine” and take a clear stand “against the genocide in Gaza.” They express their anger, incomprehension, and moral outrage; “Government brutality must not go unchallenged.”

A human rights-based argument is often used to justify this. “Because I find Israel’s military actions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to be a violation of human rights.” The responses range from the word “human rights” or the diagnosis “because genocide is taking place in Gaza” to detailed accounts of historical events and discussions of one’s own relationship to, or Germany’s responsibility for, the events. “Because I can’t believe that Germany supports something like this and makes me an accomplice.” It is often pointed out that learning processes have begun in recent months and that there has been a more in-depth examination of the conflict between Israel and

Palestine:

“The conflict was always a gray area for me. Now I understand the different perspectives much better, and that’s why I can now constructively advocate for human rights for all people.”

The participants are shocked and outraged by the German government’s hesitant, lack of action, or even supportive stance toward Israel’s conduct of the war:

“To show that many Germans are against the genocide, the actions of the Israeli government, and the inaction of the German government. There is still no strong political voice coming out of Germany condemning the disproportionate war against Palestine, and we cannot allow this to go unchallenged.”

There is talk of “complicity in genocide” and unacceptable bias in reporting on Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip. Some demonstrators cynically comment on the prevailing discourse: “Because I am actually against genocide and want to stand up for a free, socialist, secular Palestine where everyone can live. But that’s just my opinion.”

Our open survey reveals that emotional concern about the conditions in the Gaza Strip and the long-standing support provided by the German government are predominant themes. Many participants also seem to feel that these conditions should be acknowledged and not concealed, excused, or relativized. Recognizing and explicitly naming the situation in Gaza as genocide is a particular concern for many. Concrete recommendations for action are also derived from this:

“I am shocked and angry about the situation in the Gaza Strip and want Germany, like the rest of the world, to recognize this as genocide. Germany should also stop all arms deliveries and impose sanctions on Israel.”

In addition to the desire for solidarity with the Palestinian civilian population, the responses also reveal a growing resentment toward German institutions (both state and media) and their

involvement in war crimes, as well as a strong distrust of their perception of reality.

Trust in democratic order

In order to better assess the protest milieu, we used a series of questions designed to provide information about the participants' relationships to institutions and society. For example, we asked how satisfied the demonstrators were with democracy. Here, a distinction was made between democracy as an idea and democracy as it currently functions in Germany (see Figure 14). While two-thirds of respondents are satisfied (31%) or very satisfied (33.3%) with democracy in general, this figure is much lower for democracy as it functions in Germany. Well over half are dissatisfied (32.5%) or very dissatisfied (23.4%). However, this discrepancy between general satisfaction and specific dissatisfaction with democracy in Germany is not unusual and is also evident in surveys of demonstrators on other topics.

The results regarding trust in various public institutions and organizations (see Figure 15) also show low to moderate levels of trust among respondents. Trust in government bodies, the media, and security institutions varies significantly, with a general skepticism toward central political and executive actors evident. This skepticism is most evident toward the federal government: 37.8% of respondents say they have very little trust, while another 32.3% express little trust. Only 6.4% express a lot of trust, and no one expresses a great deal of trust. The verdict on the Bundestag is similarly critical, with around half of those surveyed (50.8%) expressing little or very little trust. Moderate trust is expressed by 32.4%, while only a minority (approx. 16%) express a lot or a great deal of trust. Trust in local government is somewhat more pronounced: the government or administration of respondents' own cities receive comparatively more favorable ratings, with 44.4% expressing moderate trust and 8.8% expressing high trust, while mistrust is less pronounced here. The picture is much more positive when it comes to the judiciary: 35.2% express moderate trust and a further 46% express a lot or a great deal of trust, while only a minority express explicit distrust. This suggests that the courts are perceived as a comparatively trustworthy institution.

Trust in traditional media is predominantly moderate: 35.3% express moderate trust, 23.9% very little trust, and 24.7% little trust. This means that a certain degree of skepticism prevails here as well, although the media is rated slightly better than the federal government. A similar pattern can be seen for social media: the majority (56.4%) rate their trust as low or moderate, while very high trust is rare. This suggests an ambivalent relationship with digital sources of information—they are clearly used, but not necessarily perceived as reliable. Overall, the similarity with which traditional and social media are perceived in terms of trustworthiness is surprising.

Trust in security institutions reveals a clearly critical finding. Over 60% of respondents express little or very little trust in the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, while high levels of trust are rarely mentioned. Skepticism toward the police is even more pronounced: 47% say they have very little trust, and 26.7% say they have little trust. Only 6% express high levels of trust, while “very high” levels of trust are virtually non-existent.

Political positioning

However, the findings on trust in institutions and German democracy do not indicate any general disillusionment with politics among the demonstrators. This is particularly evident in the “Sunday question” (Which party would you vote for if federal elections were held next Sunday?). Here, 64% name the Left Party (see Figure 16). The party enjoys high approval ratings among those respondents who have rarely or occasionally participated in demonstrations; only among those who stated that they had participated in more than 20 demonstrations in the past do approval ratings for small parties such as Mera25 predominate. Since the latter make up only 7% of respondents, approval of the Left Party appears to be particularly high outside this core group of demonstrators in solidarity with Palestine—among whom, in turn, supporters of other parties are most likely to be found: those who stated that they had never demonstrated for Gaza before were also most likely to say they would vote for the Greens or the SPD. Similarly, one-fifth of respondents said they were involved in the Left Party or other organizations, which illustrates the

extent to which people engaged in civil society beyond the party circle also took part in the protests.

The respondents' self-assessment on the left-right scale also shows a clearly left-wing profile among the participants (see Figure 17). The vast majority of respondents placed themselves on the left of the spectrum (0–3). With 26.5% of responses, category “2” is the most frequently represented, followed by “0” with 25.6% and “1” with 20.7%. A further 18.2% positioned themselves at “3,” which is still clearly on the left side of the scale. Only 4.9% of respondents chose the middle position “4,” and 4.1% gave the value “5.” Values above “5” were not mentioned. Overall, this reveals a strongly left-leaning self-image among the demonstration participants. The complete absence of higher values on the scale makes it clear that people with a conservative or right-wing political self-assessment were hardly represented. This result corresponds to the content-related orientation of the demonstration and indicates that mobilization took place primarily within a clearly left-wing political spectrum. This shows overlap with other anti-war demonstrations, which also often have a clearly left-wing participant profile (Meier et al. 2023; Daphi et al. 2014).

Attitude toward social controversies

The respondents' assessments of the social context in Germany (see Figure 18) reveal a critical and, at the same time, politically strongly positioned opinion. The attitude toward the question of state recognition of Palestine is particularly clear: almost all respondents (89.9% completely, 8.1% somewhat) are in favor of such recognition. There is practically no opposition to this. This result illustrates the central political consensus among respondents, who view the recognition of Palestine as an act of fundamental justice and political self-determination. There is also a high level of agreement with the statement that large sections of German society do not understand what is really happening in Gaza. Sixty-six percent of

respondents share this assessment (30.3% strongly agree, 35.7% somewhat agree), while only around 11% disagree. This points to a perceived discrepancy between public perception and their own view of events, i.e., an experience of media or social distortion.

This tendency is evident in the statement that there is enough space in Germany to mourn the victims in Gaza. Here, the respondents disagree by a clear majority: more than half (50.2%) tend to disagree, and another 37.9% express a neutral opinion. The almost complete lack of agreement shows that many participants perceive a deficit in public empathy and visibility of Palestinian suffering.

A clear majority of respondents (73.2%) also agree with the statement that racism in Germany has increased since October 7, 2023. Only just under 9% disagree, while 15.6% take a middle position. This result shows a widespread perception of an increasingly discriminatory or hostile social atmosphere, especially towards people who are perceived as Palestinian, Arab, or Muslim. The statement that Jewish life in Germany should be given special protection due to its history is also rated very positively. 78.7% agree (44.7% strongly agree, 34% somewhat agree), while only about 5% disagree.

This high level of agreement highlights a strong awareness of Germany's special historical responsibility. A clear majority of participants also believe that the German government should work to secure the release of the Israeli hostages: 41.3% agree completely, 24.8% agree somewhat, and 24.4% agree partially. This finding underscores that the overwhelming majority does not see the efforts to end the suffering in Gaza and the efforts to end the suffering of the Israeli hostages as competing with each other.¹⁰

This attitude is also evident in the open-ended responses of some participants, as the following quote shows:

¹⁰ Neither clear approval nor clear rejection of the release of the Israeli hostages can be inferred from this, as the negative attitude expressed in this item may also refer to the federal government.

"I was truly shocked by the Hamas massacres on October 7, 2023, but I am equally horrified by what is happening in the Gaza war. It leaves me increasingly stunned."

Assessment of public discourse

Assessments of openness to expressing one's own political views on Gaza in various social contexts (see Figure 19) reveal clear differences between private and public spaces. Overall, a pattern can be identified that points to a pronounced context dependency of political expression.

Respondents experience the most openness in their family environment: 47.6% strongly agree and a further 31.7% somewhat agree that they can openly discuss their views there. Only 5.2% somewhat disagree and hardly anyone strongly disagrees. A similar, albeit slightly less pronounced, picture emerges among friends and acquaintances: 77.2% feel free to express their opinions there (43.1% completely, 34.1% somewhat). This means that close personal relationships are the main spaces in which political discussions about Gaza appear to be possible largely without fear and in a spirit of solidarity.

However, respondents are much more cautious when it comes to public and institutional contexts. At work or in education, only 29.6% agree or somewhat agree that they can openly express their views, while 42.5% somewhat disagree or completely disagree. A further 27.9% take a neutral position. This result indicates a pronounced uncertainty or even self-censorship in the professional environment. A similarly divided picture emerges in the public sphere: only about 35% say they can openly express their political views there, while around 35% expressly deny this and 27.7% take a middle position. These figures indicate a high degree of restraint in public discussions, possibly due to social stigmatization, media polarization, or fear of negative consequences.

Overall, the data shows that the possibility of open political articulation on Gaza depends heavily on social context. While private and familiar environments (family, circle of friends) are perceived as safe spaces for communication, institutional and public spaces are often considered restrictive or risky. This difference may indicate a

shift in political communication to the private sphere and reflects a tense social climate in which open solidarity with Gaza does not appear to be possible everywhere without risk.

Concerns and expectations

The assessments of the statement "I am/was concerned that positions I find problematic will be represented at the demonstration" show an overall reserved opinion (Figure 11). Only a minority of respondents expressed clear agreement: 5.1% agree completely, 16.3% somewhat agree. This means that a total of around 21.4% say they shared such concerns at least to some extent. A quarter of respondents (25.5%) rated the statement as neutral ("partly/partly"), while the majority rejected it (36.1% "somewhat disagree," 16.3% "strongly disagree"). Taken together, more than half of the participants (52.4%) reject the statement. However, the fact that more than 20% of respondents were concerned about this seems high, given that people were initially demonstrating for a "common cause." This shows that some people are uncertain about the correct context of the movement and are cautious about being associated with problematic statements, or seem unsure about how others justify their solidarity with Gaza. The long public debate about anti-Semitism related to Israel probably plays a decisive role here.

The results for the statement "I am/was concerned that I would be treated with hostility by passers-by during the demonstration" show that only a small proportion of respondents shared such fears. Only 9.2% agreed with the statement; no responses were given for "strongly agree" or were below the evaluation threshold. 15.3% of respondents took a neutral position ("partly/partly"), while a clear majority rejected the statement. A total of 38.5% tended to disagree and 35.5% strongly disagreed. Taken together, around three-quarters of respondents (74.0%) reject the statement.

The demonstrators are significantly more concerned about the public portrayal of the demonstration in the media. 43.9% strongly agree with the statement "I am/was concerned that the media will not report on the protest in a balanced manner." A further 35.1% somewhat agree. Approximately four out of five participants are

concerned that the media will not report on the demonstrations in a balanced manner, a figure that is worrying in terms of trust in the media landscape. Our next question also provides information about the demonstrators' trust in the media – and paints a rather mixed picture (see Figure 20). When asked “How do you mainly get your information about developments in Gaza?”, 20.8% of respondents said they get their information from German print, TV, and radio media. Social media is the most important source for about twice as many people (43%). International press, TV, and radio media rank second with 30.4% (other: 5.7%).

Discussion and outlook

Empirical data on patterns of participation, socio-political attitudes, and motives of protesters allow for a differentiated view of social conflicts. Such an objective perspective is particularly important when highly contested issues lead to a narrowing of debate and sweeping generalizations. Extensive literature shows that solidarity with Palestine is a particularly extreme case in this regard, characterized by multiple forms of legal and administrative criminalization and discursive delegitimization.

In this context, the present study addresses a gap in research: While numerous analyses of street protests are available internationally (Crowd Counters 2024; Crowd Counting Consortium and Ash Center 2024), there is currently a lack of reliable data on the composition and attitude structure of Palestine solidarity protests in Germany that goes beyond case vignettes and media evaluations. It uses a standardized, tried-and-tested survey design with on-site recruitment and a bilingual questionnaire, supplemented by short interviews to control for bias.

Although the findings of this study cannot be considered representative of solidarity with Palestine in Germany as a whole, they are based on the largest mobilizations in this country to date and may represent a first step toward an urgently needed objectification of the debate. The findings provide an empirical counterpoint to highly politicized but widespread generalizations—such as the blanket portrayal of solidarity with Palestine

as extremist—by offering reliable evidence of the heterogeneity and internal diversity of the participants. They reveal how diverse and multifaceted the mobilization actually is.

Overall, the data shows that the protests were predominantly supported by **highly educated, relatively young participants with clear left-wing political views**. The findings point to a protest culture rooted in civil society, which focuses primarily on education, mobilization, and moral positioning. The respondents' engagement with Gaza, as surveyed, concentrates on nonviolent, legal, and communicative forms of expression.

Political participation thus appears to be strongly influenced by moral and symbolic considerations, with **an emphasis on public visibility, expressions of solidarity, and peaceful influence**. In this respect, there are no striking differences between protesters in Germany and those protesting on other issues. Confrontational forms of protest remain marginal phenomena. The fact that **some of the demonstrators identify themselves as part of the peace movement** can be interpreted in different ways: on the one hand, as an indication that, despite little organizational overlap, the protests also attracted people from the traditional peace movement, which has lost ground in Germany in recent years (Meier and Daphi 2025). On the other hand, the results could also indicate that the violence in the Middle East has prompted a whole new group of people to take a stand against war, who are claiming the label of the peace movement for themselves in the context of Gaza. In any case, a more detailed examination of the relationship between Palestine solidarity and the peace movement and peace policy in general is warranted.

This is all the more true given that a large majority of respondents also take a **nuanced stance on the Middle East conflict**, contradicting the common assumption that protests in solidarity with Palestine equate to exclusive support for only one side of the conflict. Thus, the statement “Germany should recognize the Palestinian state” receives the highest level of agreement in our questionnaire on social controversies—which is hardly surprising for a demonstration in solidarity with Palestine. However, the statement “Jewish life should be given special protection in Germany because of its history” ranks second in terms of

approval ratings. This shows a reflective protest milieu that is capable of addressing complex conflict constellations with **differentiated positions without hierarchizing victim groups** or playing off their respective concerns against each other.

At the same time, respondents perceive increasing racism and social intolerance. This clearly points to the **protesters' universalist attitude toward human rights and international law**, which stands in stark contrast to dominant public perceptions. The protesters are also aware of this humanistic self-image. Only a minority of respondents expressed concern that problematic positions were being represented at the demonstration—there was much more concern that the demonstration would not be reported on in a differentiated manner.

Finally, the results show that **repression and experiences of marginalization in the context of Gaza activism are not a marginal phenomenon**, but have concrete and sometimes serious consequences for many respondents. The high proportion of reports of intimidation and violence is particularly worrying, as it points to a social climate of fear and marginalization. The data thus makes it clear that political engagement in this area is not only symbolically risky, but can also be dangerous.

However, **the data does not indicate a general disillusionment with politics or democracy**. Rather, the data points to a loss of trust in the actions of specific institutions of the democratic order. The **differentiation in institutional trust** is noteworthy. Relative to security-related and executive institutions, trust levels in courts and local government are high. The fact that these trust levels do not express a fundamental attitude can be seen, for example, in the fact that trust in the police, which has been involved in direct confrontations with previous protests, is higher than in the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Courts, which regularly restrict or overturn restrictive decisions by authorities regarding

protests, enjoy by far the highest level of trust. While it remains unclear whether these differences are due to such direct experiences or whether they reflect a general trust in institutions that are not involved in day-to-day politics, the findings contradict the assumption that protesters perceive the state or democracy as a monolithic block.

This also applies to political parties. The high approval ratings for the Left Party are striking. On the one hand, the party has obviously succeeded in mobilizing its members. However, many protest participants who are not themselves members express a preference for the party. Only among respondents with long experience in the Palestine solidarity movement do approval ratings for small parties such as Mera25 predominate. Given the party's prominent role in organizing the feeder protest, this proximity to the left is to be expected. However, the striking party political profile also indicates that the left is increasingly succeeding in establishing itself as an advocate for the Palestinian cause across the party spectrum. Surveys on the situation in Gaza among the general population at the time of the demonstration show how large the potential voter base is that can be addressed in this way. Individual references to this can be found in the open responses.¹¹ Individual references to this can be found in the open answers:

“Because finally, a federal party has broken its silence, albeit belatedly, and joined the people on the streets. Also because this party has supported the Palestinian voice. But above all, because I can no longer bear the horror and complicity of our government... anger, anger, anger.”

It remains to be seen whether the party's prominent role in the protests will translate into party loyalty among participants. Other parties that have played a role in human rights and peace-oriented mobilizations in the past are not very popular among participants. The SPD and the

¹¹ Forsa polls conducted in July and August showed that 74% of Germans believe that the Federal Republic should exert more pressure on Israel in view of the devastating humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip. 54% were in favor of recognizing Palestine as a state.

Greens, for example, have approval ratings of only 2% and 8%, respectively.¹²

Key works in protest and movement research illustrate how perceptions of protest movements are closely intertwined with the information available about protesters and their concerns (Della Porta et al. 2020; McCammon et al. 2007; Giugni et al. 2005; Alimi and Maney 2018). Reporting focused on order and security usually dampens public sympathy, while findings on participant profiles can correct polarizing narratives. In this constellation, **sound empirical data is particularly important** because it brings calm to public debates and demoralizes assessments of protest: it soberly shows who is speaking, what fuels their criticism, and how broadly motives are actually distributed.

In the context of solidarity with Palestine, it is sometimes overlooked that **protest is a fundamental right and a core component of pluralistic democracies**. The internal social conflicts that have arisen around solidarity with Palestine on German streets are also **shaping the future of post-migrant society**. This study contributes to objectifying these conflicts—and how they are dealt with. However, this is only the beginning.

¹² The extent to which this is exclusively related to their stance on Gaza cannot be systematically verified on the basis of our data.

Bibliography

- Albanese, Francesca. 2024. *Anatomy of a Genocide*. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967 A/HRC/55/73. UNHRC. <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session55/advance-versions/a-hrc-55-73-auv.pdf>.
- Alimi, Eitan Y., und Gregory M. Maney. 2018. „Focusing on Focusing Events: Event Selection, Media Coverage, and the Dynamics of Contentious Meaning-Making“. *Sociological Forum* 33 (3): 757–82. <https://doi.org/10.1111/socf.12442>.
- Al-Taher, Hanna. 2024. „Deutsche Staatsräson und die Verunmöglichung Palästinensischer Realität“. *Peripherie* 44 (2–2024): 250–59. <https://doi.org/10.3224/peripherie.v44i2.08>.
- Amnesty International. 2024. *‘You Feel Like You Are Subhuman’: Israel’s Genocide Against Palestinians in Gaza*. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/8668/2024/en/>.
- Anderl, Felix, Zaha Al Ghusain, Carolin Büchter, u. a. 2025. *Kleine Stadt, großer Christopher Street Day*. 1/2025. ipb working papers. Institut für Protest- und Bewegungsforschung. <https://protestinstitut.eu/publikationen/kleine-stadt-grosser-christopher-street-day/>.
- Andretta, Massimiliano, und Donatella della Porta. 2014. „Surveying Protestors: Why and How“. In *Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research*, herausgegeben von Donatella della Porta. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719571.003.0013>.
- Arzt, Clemens. 2025. „Sind Versammlungsverbote bald der Normalfall? Von Corona über »Klimakleber« zum Krieg in Gaza“. In *Grundrechte-Report 2024*. S. Fischer. <https://www.fischerverlage.de/buch/grundrechte-report-2024-9783596710843>.
- Atshan, Sa’Ed, und Katharina Galor. 2020. *The Moral Triangle: Germans, Israelis, Palestinians*. Duke University Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv11sn7wt>.
- Aue, Stefan, Laro Bogan, Anne Gräfe, und Susanne Leeb. 2025. „Zunehmend Autoritär“. *Berlin Review*, März 25. <https://blnreview.de/en/ausgaben/2025-04/leeb-aue-bogan-graefe-autoritaer-kunsthochschulen-antisemitismus>.
- Bartov, Omer. 2024. „As a Former Idf Soldier and Historian of Genocide, i Was Deeply Disturbed by My Recent Visit to Israel“. *The Guardian*, August 13. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/13/israel-gaza-historian-omer-bartov>.
- Boykoff, Jules. 2006. „Framing Dissent: Mass-Media Coverage of the Global Justice Movement“. *New Political Science* 28 (2): 201–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07393140600679967>.
- Brandenburg, Klaas-Wilhelm, und Noura Mahdhaoui. 2024. „Deutsche Berichterstattung über Nahost-Krieg erweckt wenig Vertrauen“. *tagesschau.de*, August 28. <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/gesellschaft/berichterstattung-gaza-100.html>.
- B’Tselem. 2021. „A Regime of Jewish Supremacy from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea: This Is Apartheid“. Januar 12. http://www.btselem.org/publications/fulltext/202101_this_is_apartheid.
- Crowd Counting Consortium und Ash Center. 2024. *An Empirical Overview of Recent Pro-Palestine Protests at U.S. Schools*. Mai 30. <https://ash.harvard.edu/articles/crowd-counting-blog-an-empirical-overview-of-recent-pro-palestine-protests-at-u-s-schools/>.
- crowdcounters. 2024. „Three Things the Pro-Palestine Movement Is Not“. *Counting Crowds*, Mai 10. <https://countingcrowds.org/2024/05/10/three-things-the-pro-palestine-movement-is-not/>.
- Daphi, Priska, Sebastian Haunss, Moritz Sommer, und Simon Teune. 2023. „Taking to the Streets in Germany – Disenchanted and Confident Critics in Mass Demonstrations“. *German Politics* 32 (3): 440–68. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2021.1998459>.
- Daphi, Priska, Dieter Rucht, Wolfgang Stuppert, Simon Teune, und Peter Ullrich. 2014. *Occupy Frieden: Eine Befragung der Teilnehmer/innen der Mahnwache für den Frieden*. ipb working papers. Institut für Protest- und Bewegungsforschung. https://protestinstitut.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/ipb-wp-2014.1_Occupy-Frieden.pdf.
- Della Porta, Donatella. 2024. „Moral panic and repression: The contentious politics of anti-semitism in germany“. *Partecipazione e Conflitto. An international journal* 17 (2): 276–349.
- Della Porta, Donatella, Pietro Castelli Gattinara, Konstantinos Eleftheriadis, und Andrea Felicetti. 2020. „Discursive turns and critical junctures: An introduction“. In *Discursive Turns and Critical Junctures: Debating Citizenship after the Charlie Hebdo Attacks*, herausgegeben von Donatella Della Porta, Pietro

- Castelli Gattinara, Konstantinos Eleftheriadis, und Andrea Felicetti. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190097431.003.0001>.
- Der Tagesspiegel Online*. 2025. „Nach Großdemo für Gaza in Berlin: ‚Unser Protest wird weitergehen, so lange es nötig ist‘“. September 28. <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/nach-grossdemo-fur-gaza-in-berlin-unser-protest-wird-weitergehen-so-lange-es-notig-ist-14408243.html>.
- Earl, Jennifer, Andrew Martin, John D. McCarthy, und Sarah A. Soule. 2004. „The use of newspaper data in the study of collective action“. *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (1): 65–80. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110603>.
- Fillieule, Olivier, und Philippe Blanchard. 2010. „Individual Surveys in Rallies (INSURA): A New Tool for Exploring Transnational Activism?“ In *The Transnational Condition: Protest Dynamics in an Entangled Europe*, herausgegeben von Simon Teune. Berghahn Books.
- Giugni, Marco, Ruud Koopmans, Florence Passy, und Paul Statham. 2005. „Institutional and Discursive Opportunities for Extreme-Right Mobilization in Five Countries“. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 10 (1): 145–62. <https://doi.org/10.17813/mai.10.1.n40611874k23l1v7>.
- Goldmann, Fabian. 2025. *Staats(räson)funk*. Manifest Verlag. <https://manifest-buecher.de/produkt/staats-raesonfunk/>.
- Grimm, Jannis Julien. 2024. „On Academic Integrity and Historic Responsibility: Shrinking Spaces for Critical Debate in Germany after October 7“. In *The War on Gaza and Middle East Political Science*, Bd. 51. POMEPS Studies. Project on Middle East Political Science. https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/POMEPS_Studies_51_Web-1.pdf.
- Grimm, Jannis Julien, und Lilian Mauthofer. 2025. „Multi-Perspectivity & Ethical Representation in the Context of Gaza & October 7: Addressing the Semantic Void“. *Daedalus* 154 (2): 169–88. https://doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_02146.
- Grimm, Jannis Julien, Lilian Mauthofer, Thaddäa Sixta, und Elias Steinhilper. 2025. „Discursive Conditions of Solidarity Mobilization: Selective Visibility, Fragmented Representation and the Securitisation of Palestine Solidarity“. Unpublished manuscript. Berlin.
- Haugbolle, Sune, und Pelle Valentin Olsen. 2023. „Emergence of Palestine as a Global Cause“. *Middle East Critique* 32 (1): 129–48. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2023.2168379>.
- Haunss, Sebastian, Priska Daphi, Jan Matti Dollbaum, Jannis Julien Grimm, und Larissa Meier. 2023. *Klimaproteste in Deutschland – wenig Abgrenzung zwischen den Protestgruppen*. Institut für Protest- und Bewegungsforschung. <https://protestinstitut.eu/publikationen/klimaproteste-in-deutschland-wenig-abgrenzung-zwischen-den-protestgruppen/>.
- Hever, Shir. 2019. „BDS Suppression Attempts in Germany Backfire“. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 48 (3): 86–96. <https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2019.48.3.86>.
- Human Rights Watch. 2024. *Extermination and Acts of Genocide: Israel Deliberately Depriving Palestinians in Gaza of Water*. Dezember 19. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/12/19/extermination-and-acts-genocide/israel-deliberately-depriving-palestinians-gaza>.
- IAGS. 2025. „IAGS Resolution on the Situation in Gaza“. August 31. <https://genocidescholars.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/IAGS-Resolution-on-Gaza-FINAL.pdf>.
- Klandermans, Bert. 2022. „Survey Research“. In *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm208.pub2>.
- Koch, Katharina, und Nora Jasmin Ragab. 2018. *Mapping and Study of the Palestinian Diaspora in Germany*. Centre for International Migration and Development. https://diaspora2030.de/fileadmin/files/Service/Publikationen/Studien_zu_Diaspora-Aktivitaeten_in_Deutschland/giz-2018-en-diasporastudy-palestine.pdf.
- Leber, Sebastian. 2025. „Gaza-Protesttag mit internen Konflikten: Warum die Linke Angst vor ihrer eigenen Demonstration hat“. *Tagesspiegel* (Berlin), September 26. <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/gaza-protesttag-mit-internen-konflikten-warum-die-linke-angst-vor-ihrer-eigenen-demonstration-hat-14389808.html>.
- Marwecki, Daniel. 2020. *Germany and Israel: White-washing and Statebuilding*. Oxford University Press.
- Mauthofer, Lilian, und Jannis Julien Grimm. 2025. „Zwischen Wissenschaftsfreiheit und Palästina-Solidarität: Deutsche Hochschulen als umkämpfte Räume“. *Forschungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen* 37 (1).
- McCammon, Holly J., Harmony D. Newman, Courtney Sanders Muse, und Teresa M. Terrell. 2007.

- „Movement Framing and Discursive Opportunity Structures: The Political Successes of the U.S. Women’s Jury Movements“. *American Sociological Review* 72 (5): 725–49.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240707200504>.
- Meier, Larissa, und Priska Daphi. 2025. *Konflikte um Frieden*. Forschungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen. März 31. <https://www.degruyter-brill.com/document/doi/10.1515/fjsb-2025-2015/html>.
- Meier, Larissa, Priska Daphi, und Sebastian Haunss. 2023. „Stoppt die Kriege – Abrüstung und Deeskalation jetzt!“ – ipb – Institut für Protest- und Bewegungsforschung. 2/2023. ipb working papers. Institut für Protest- und Bewegungsforschung. <https://protestinstitut.eu/publikationen/stoppt-die-kriege-abruerstung-und-deeskalation-jetzt-eine-befragung-des-ostermarschs-in-bielefeld-2022/>.
- O’Brien, Melanie. 2025. „Is Genocide Happening in Gaza?“ *Opinio Juris*, August 4. <https://opiniojuris.org/2025/08/04/is-genocide-happening-in-gaza/>.
- Pallies, palestine reveals, Palästina Spricht, und ADU. 2025. *Repression of Palestine Solidarity in Germany*. Juli 17. <https://www.palaestinaspricht.de/news/report-repression-of-palestine-solidarity-in-germany>.
- Peterson, Abby, Mattias Wahlström, und Magnus Wennerhag. 2018a. „‘Normalized’ Pride? Pride Parade Participants in Six European Countries“. *Sexualities* 21 (7): 1146–69.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1363460717715032>.
- Peterson, Abby, Mattias Wahlström, und Magnus Wennerhag. 2018b. *Pride Parades and LGBT Movements: Political Participation in an International Comparative Perspective*. Herausgegeben von Abby Peterson. Gender and Comparative Politics. Taylor & Francis Routledge [Imprint].
- Rainsford, Emily, und Clare Saunders. 2024. *Chapter 18: Using Surveys to Study Demonstrators*. <https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/book/9781803922027/book-part-9781803922027-25.xml>.
- Rucht, Dieter, Elias Steinhilper, und Piotr Kocyba. 2024. *Für Vielfalt, Toleranz und Miteinander*. 2/2024. Institut für Protest- und Bewegungsforschung. <https://protestinstitut.eu/publikationen/fuer-vielfalt-toleranz-und-miteinander/>.
- Rüdiger, Wolfgang. 2008. „Assessing Nonresponse Bias in Activist Surveys“. *Quality & Quantity* 44 (1): 173–80.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-008-9184-9>.
- Stekelenburg, Jacquelin van, Stefaan Walgrave, Bert Klandermans, und Joris Verhulst. 2012. „Contextualizing Contestation. Framework, Design and Data“. *Mobilization: An International Journal* 17 (3): 249–62.
<https://doi.org/10.17813/mai.17.3.a4418x2q772153x2>.
- Strippel, Christian, Kai Hafez, Carsten Reinemann, und Mandy Tröger. 2025. „Freiheit zu schweigen? Die deutsche Kommunikationswissenschaft im Nahostdiskurs“. *Global Media Journal-German Edition* 15 (1). <https://www.globalmediajournal.de/index.php/gmj/article/view/344>.
- tagesschau.de. 2025. „60.000 Menschen demonstrieren in Berlin gegen Krieg im Gazastreifen“. tagesschau.de, September 27. <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/regional/berlin/demo-gaza-protest-berlin-102.html>.
- Teune, Simon, und Peter Ullrich. 2015. *Analyse: Demonstrationbefragungen – Grenzen einer Forschungsmethode*. Forschungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen. September 1. <https://www.degruyter-brill.com/document/doi/10.1515/fjsb-2015-0313/html>.
- Tröger, Mandy, und Kai Hafez. 2024. „Der Gaza-Krieg, die deutschen Medien und die »falsche Seite der Geschichte«?“ *Journalistik* 7 (2): 238–47.
<https://doi.org/10.1453/2569-152X-22024-14224-de>.
- Ullrich, Peter. 2024. „Wird ausgerechnet anti-antisemitismus zum vehikel und katalysator der gegenwärtigen autoritären wende?“ *The Cultural Memory of the Lebanese Civil War-Revisited. Luxemburg: Gesellschaftsanalyse und Linke Praxis* 2 (Dezember).
https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004710627_013.
- Ullrich, Peter. 2025. „Bitte keine Polizei – der «Fall ASH» und der autoritäre Anti-Antisemitismus“. *Berlin Review*. <https://blnreview.de/ausgaben/2025-09/peter-ullrich-autoritaerer-anti-antisemitismus-alice-salomon-hochschule>.
- Walgrave, Stefaan, und Joris Verhulst. 2011. „Selection and Response Bias in Protest Surveys“. *Mobilization (San Diego)* 16 (2): 203–22.
- Walgrave, Stefaan, Ruud Wouters, und Pauline Ketelaars. 2016. „Response Problems in the Protest Survey Design: Evidence from Fifty-One Protest Events in Seven Countries*“. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 21 (1): 83–104.
<https://doi.org/10.17813/1086/671X-21-1-83>.

Appendix

Figure 1: What is your highest completed level of education?




Figure 2: Where were you born?




Figure 3: Did you attend this demonstration accompanied by others? [multiple choice]




Figure 4: A broad alliance of organizations and initiatives mobilized for today's demonstrations. Are you active in one of the organizations that called for the demonstrations? [multiple choice]




Figure 5: Have you been a passive or active member of any of the following organizations in the past 12 months? A passive member is someone who pays membership fees without further involvement; an active member is someone who participates, holds an office, or takes on a role.




Figure 6: Have you previously participated in another Gaza-related demonstration?




Figure 7: In the past two years, have you participated in any of the following activities related to Gaza?



Figure 8: Have you experienced repression in the context of activities related to Gaza?




Figure 9: If yes, what kind of repression was it?




Figure 10: Have you experienced repression in the context of activities related to Gaza? X Have you previously participated in another Gaza-related demonstration?




Figure 11: To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding today's demonstration?




Figure 12: People take part in this demonstration for different reasons. How important were the following motives to you?




Figure 13: Apart from the motives, there are questions about the effectiveness of protests. How effective do you think the demonstrations in solidarity with Gaza are in...




Figure 14: How satisfied are you with democracy...




Figure 15: Below is a list of public institutions and other organizations. Please indicate how much trust you have in them.




Figure 16: Which party would you vote for if the federal election were held next Sunday?




Figure 17: In politics, people often talk about “left” and “right.” On the following scale, “0” represents someone who is far left, and “10” represents someone who is far right. Where would you place yourself on this scale?




Figure 18: To what extent do you agree with the following statements about the societal context in Germany?




Figure 19: Consider different social contexts: To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "I can openly discuss my political stance on Gaza."





Figure 20: What is your main source of information about developments in Gaza?



The following ipb working papers have recently been published:



Kleine Stadt, großer Christopher Street Day: Sichtbar politisiert, polizeikritisch und trans*formativ - Demonstrationsbeobachtung des CSD Marburg vom 05.07.2024

Autor*innen: Felix Anderl, Zaha Al Ghusain, Carolin Büchter, Luisa Bühler, Judith Susanna Braun, Kely Johanna Calle, Lara Diedrigkeit, Barbara Durrer, Sophia Isa, Jan Laukötter, Jonas Oeynhausens, Jonathan Pinell, Maresa Otten, Laura ReisserDieter Rucht

Veröffentlicht: Juli 2025 (1/2025)

<https://protestinstitut.eu/publikationen/kleine-stadt-grosser-christopher-street-day/>




Für Vielfalt, Toleranz und Miteinander: Protest in einer ostdeutschen Kleinstadt

Autor*innen: Dieter Rucht, Elias Steinhilper, Piotr Kocyba

Veröffentlicht: (2/2024)

<https://protestinstitut.eu/publikationen/fuer-vielfalt-toleranz-und-miteinander/>



Für Demokratie – gegen Rechtsextremismus: Profil und Dynamik der jüngsten Protestwelle

Autor*innen: Dieter Rucht

Veröffentlicht: (1/2024)

<https://protestinstitut.eu/publikationen/fuer-demokratie-gegen-rechtsextremismus/>

Institute for Protest and Social Movement Research (ipb)

<https://protestinstitut.eu/>